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IN THE SUPR.EHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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~OBERT
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----oorJoo---BRIEF 0F RESP0tTDENT
NATURE

OF

CASE

In this appeal Plaintiff/Appellant has petitioned this
court to review the judgment of the trial court regarding the
d~stribution

of property and obligations accumulated by the

parties during the marriage; the award of alioony; and the trial
court's failure to award reasonable attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Following extensive pre-trial negotiations and pretrial order, this matter was tried before the Honorable Peter
~.

Leary.

::luring two days of trial, the court heard testimony

from seven witnesses, including four expert witnesses testifying
as to the value of personal property accumulated by the parties;
received into evidence eighteen exhibits; and subsequently took
the matter under advisement for a period in excess of 60 days.
Based upon the evidence presented at the time of trial, plaintiff was awarded real and personal property valued at $26 7, 246. 00,
or 66~~ of the total, and defendant was awarded real and personal
Property valued at $135,540.00, or 34% of the total.

All real
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and personal property awarded in the decree of divorce was valued
either by appraisal or by stipulation of the parties.
The court further ordered that Plaintiff pay
$10,631.00 of the debts and obligations incurred during the
marriage or

58~~

of the total, and that defendant pay $7,567.00

of the debts and obligations so incurred, or
not the

72".~

-

23~~

42".~

of the total,

split alledged in appellants brief.

In addition the court awarded Plaintiff $400.00 per
month alimony, to be paid for a period of 48 months, with the
right of Plaintiff to petition the court for an extension of
payment of alimony.

Furthermore, Defendant was awarded a lien

against the home of the parties for his share of the equity, to
be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant upon occurrence of the first
of the following events:

re-marriage of the Plaintiff;

Plaintiff ceases to reside in the home or any part thereof is
rented: a non-related male resides in the home; the minor child
graduates from high school or is otherwise emancipated.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff has petitioned this court to remand the
case for a reconsideration of the property distribution; debt
distribution; award of alimony; and award of attorney's fees.
In the alternative, Plaintiff requests this court to review
the evidence presented at the trial and fashion its own award.
It is the position of the Defendant/Respondent that
the judgment of the trial court is consistent with the pre-trial
order and the extensive evidence presented at the time of trial;
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chat the trial court went to great length to review and consider
che evidence; and therefore, the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed, and this court ought to award Defendant
his costs and attorney's fees on appeal.
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married in San Antonio, Texas on
June 27, 1952.

Four children were born as issue of the

marriage, all of whom have now reached the age of eighteen years,
and none of whom are living with either the Plaintiff or the
Defendant.

At the time of the marriage, Defendant had completed

his Junior year at Rice University, and was completing
studies for his bachelor's degree in Engineering.

While com-

pleting his studies, and in order to assist in supporting his
family, Defendant worked part-time during the nine month school
year, and full-time during the summer months. (Tr .168; R. 542.)
Following his graduation from Rice University,
Defendant became employed with Chance-Vought Aircraft, a company
now known as E-Systems, his present employer.

At the time of

the divorce, Defendant's net monthly income was $1,887.00
(Exhibit 29-D), which sum, after the payment of alimony to the
Plaintiff, is reduced to $1,487.00.

Although Plaintiff was not

employed, she had independent income in the sum of $800.00 per
month from a trust standing in her name at National Bank of
Commerce, San Antonio, Texas (Exhibit 22-D), and additionally
was receiving $600.00 per month in stock dividends from
shares of National Bancshares stock standing in her name
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(Pretrial Order, page 4, paragraph R), for a combined gross
monthly income of $1,400. 00.

After taking into consideration

the $400. 00 per month alimony payment from Defendant, Plaintiff
has available to her a gross monthly income of $1,800.00.

This
does not take into consideration income she may earn from future

employment.
Appellant's brief goes into great detail regarding
depletion of the legacy she received at the time of her father's
death.

The fact of the matter is, and based on the pleadings

and evidence submitted at the time of trial, the legacy received
by Plaintiff and placed in trust with National Bank of Collllllerce
on May 28, 1956, was valued at that time at $66,386.01.
(Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum - Page 1).
The principal balance of the trust on March 31, 1980
was valued at $87,942.00

(Exhibit 22-D), and at the time of

trial, the trust was valued at $98,126.00.

(Tr.220; R.594.)

This in spite of the fact that there were distributions from
the trust during a 23 1/2 year period amounting to $146,599.10.
(Exhibit 22-D) Plaintiff would like this court to believe that
the entire $146,599.10 was contributed to the marriage of the
parties for the purpose of keeping body and soul together, and
that Defendant contributed little or nothing to the marriage.
The uncontroverted evidence, however, illustrates rather vividly
that during their 29 year marriage, Defendant was always
employed on a full-time basis, with the exception of two years
when he was completing his education and working part-time.
(Tr.168; R.542.)

As a result of his employment, Defendant
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contributed in excess of $500,000oOO to the support and maintenance of the family unito

(Tr.174 & 175; R.548 & 549.)

As

one would reasonably expect from a marriage of 29 years,
Defendant's income and the distribution from Plaintiff's trust
were largely co-mingled and used by the parties to manage and
pay the expenses of the family unit and provide the family
with some of the luxuries in life.

(Tr.176; R.550.)

During their marriage, the parties accumulated a
sizeable estate of real and personal property.

In addition,

during the marriage, Plaintiff inherited some antiques and other
miscellaneous items of personal property.

The only evidence

before the court with regard to the value of the real and
personal property of the parties was the testimony of expert
witnesses, the exhibits received at the time of trial, and the
testimony of the Defendant.

Throughout these lengthy divorce

proceedings, Plaintiff has had repeated opportunities to present
evidence or proffer testimony as to the extent and estimated
value of the real and personal property inherited and accumulated
by the parties during the marriage.

On

February 13, 1980,

Defendant issued Interrogatories specifically directed at having
Plaintiff provide information as to the extent and estimated
value of the real and personal property owned by the parties.
She failed to answer the Interrogatorieso

Defendant filed a

motion to compell Plaintiff to answer the requested Interrogatories.
The court ordered Plaintiff to file written answer to the
Interrogatories, however, Plaintiff failed to abide by the court
order.

In the pre-trial order Plaintiff was again ordered to

provide Defendant with estimated values of items of personal
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property accumulated during the marriage.
to abide

Again Plaintiff failei

by the court order.
The Defendant on the other hand, consistent with the

pre-trial order, arranged for appraisers to inventory and value
the personal property of the parties.

In addition, Defendant

arranged for a stock broker to testify as to the value of stocks
and other marketable securities owned by the parties at the time
of trial.

Even though the court had specifically ordered the

appraisal of the parties personal property in the home,

Pla~tili

refused to cooperate, and in fact made it extremely difficult
for Defendant and the appraiser to inventory and value the
property located in the home.

The appraisers collectively valued

the personal property in the home at $126,781.00

(Exhibits 16-D

18-D; 19-D), excluding a substantial amount of sterling silver
which was not available at the time of the appraisal.

Defendant

in his inventory of the personal property located in the home,
including the sterling silver not viewed by the appraisers,
estimated the total value of personal property in the home
$161,113.00

at

(Exhibit 21-D). If Defendant's estimate is

reduced by $16,500, the value he attributed to the silver and
included in his estimate, but not included in the value arrived
at by the appraisers, Defendant's estimate now reduced to
$144,613.00 is very similar to the professional appraisals.
In his suggested division of marital estate, and of
the items of real and personal property not stipulated to,
Defendant requested and received 1,214 shares of E-Systems
Stock; his ESY Pension; his ESOP Retirement Plan; and some items
of personal property valued at $7,244.00.

The value of the Hems
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awarded to the Defendant, including his one-half equity in the
home and some miscellaneous items of personal property awarded
ryefendant in the pre-trial order totals $135, 540. 00. (Exhibit
31-D).

".'he value of property awarded to Plaintiff pursuant

tesrimony at the time of trial; Exhibit 31-D; the pre-trial
order; and stipulation of the parties totals $267,246.00.
On the basis of $402, 786. 00, the total value of property at

the time of trial, Plaintiff was awarded 66i', and Defendant
was awarded 34%.

If Plaintiff's inherited property is

ignored, she still received $98,030.00 or 42% of the property
accumulated by the parties and Defendant received $135, 540. 00
or 58"1,.

Furthermore, the ESY Pension Plan and the ESOP

~etirement

Plan cumulatively valued on Exhibit 31-D at

S39,635.00 is not available for monthly distribution to the
Defendant until age 60, thereby substantially reducing the
lump sum value and liquidity of the property awarded to the
Defendant.
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS

:-!ISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
A.
~cree

The Standard For This Court's Review Of The

Of Divorce.
This court has on many occasions held that an action

in a divorce is largely an equitable proceeding.
~.

5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956).

Wilson v

There are many

holdings that this court may review cases of this nature and
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under proper
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circumstances.

(See, Wilson v Wilson, supra.)

In Christensen v Christensen, 21 Utah 2d

263, 444

P.2d 511 (1968) this court recognized the unique oosition of
the trial judge when it concluded:
Even though it is the established rule that
divorce cases being in equity, it the duty
of this court to review and weigh the
evidence,2 it is equally true that we have
invariably recognized the advantaged position of the trial judge and given deference
to his findings and judgment, declaring
that they should not be upset unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against
them, or unless the decree works.such an
injustice that equity and good conscience
demand that it be revised.
444 P.2dat 512.
In Bader v Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P. 2d 150, (1968)
this court in again recognizing the advantaged position of
the trial judge in matters of allocating property and income,
the court stated:
It would lead to intolerable instability of
judgments if this court should assume the
prerogative and accept the responsibility
of merely second guessing a trial judge who
has done a conscientious job of attempting
to make a just and equitable allocation of
the property and income of the parties in
regard to alimony and support money, as the
trial judge appears to have done here.
It
is due to this fact, taken into consideration with the nature of the trial judge's
authority and duty, and his advantaged
position, that in such matters he is
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of
discretion which will not be disturbed in
the absence of a clear abuse, a circumstance which we have not found here.
424 P. 2d at 151.
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B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding
~Unwarranted

Majority Of The Property To

~r.

Warren.

Plaintiff alleges that the trial court adopted
without modification the proposed distribution of marital
property pursuant to Exhibit 31-D.

Plaintiff, either prior

to the trial or during the trial made absolutely no effort
to submit either to opposing counsel, or the trial court, any
evidence or testimony regarding the value of the real and
personal property owned by the parties, nor did she provide
any evidence with respect to what she believed would be an
equitable property distribution. (Tr.259; R.633).
Plaintiff had many opportunities to present evidence
or testimony regarding values and proposed distribution of
property accumulated during the marriage.

In fact, on

February 13, 1980, Defendant served Interrogatories upon
Plaintiff specifically directed to obtain that information.
She failed to answer the Interrogatories.

On April 28, 1980,

she was ordered by the court to file answers, but again she
failed to do so.

In the Pre-Trial Order dated July 22, 1980,

she was again ordered to provide her estimated value of items
of personal property accumulated during the marriage, and her
proposed distribution of property. (Pre-Trial Order. Page 6).
Again, Plaintiff failed to comply with the court's order.
It would, therefore, appear a bit presumptuous on
the part of Plaintiff to now fault the trial court for presumably having weighed in its decision, the testimony of
Defendant and expert witnesses, each of whom provided testimony
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regarding the value of personal property of the parties.
Plaintiff should not now be allowed to petition this court
and attempt to discredit the well reasoned judgment of the
trial court.
Plaintiff, on page 10 of her brief alleges that
Defendant's estimated value of personal property grossly
exaggerates the actual value of the property.

How can such

a statement be given any credibility, particularly in light
of the fact that Plaintiff has made absolutely no effort to
either value the personal property herself or to have the
property appraised by outside independent appraisers.
Defendant, on the other hand, made a sincere effort
to itemize and value all of the items of personal property
located in the home of the parties.

His effort in that regard

resulted in an estimated value of $161,113.00. (Exhibit 21-D).
In addition, Defendant arranged for independent appraisers,
at his own expense, and as directed by the Honorable Judge
Rigtrup at the pre-trial conference to appraise the personal
property of the parties, which resulted in an estimated value
of $126, 781. 00. (Exhibit D-16, D-18 and D-19).

I t should be

noted that because the items were not available, the appraisers
excluded certain items of sterling silver place settings
which Defendant had valued at $16,500.00. (Exhibit 21-D).
If the sterling silver is deducted from Defendant's estimated
value per Exhibit 21-D, Defendant's estimate is only $17 ,832.00
higher than the appraisals submitted by the experts at the
time of trial.
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The trial judge in his determination as to the
disposition of the real and personal property of the parties
:nust have recognized that Defendant's estimates were his own
opinion, and that perhaps he had little professional expertise
in appraising personal property of that nature.

However, the

Court also seemed to recognize that the estimates of Defendant
were very similar to the appraisals submitted by the expert
witnesses.

Therefore, some credibility must be given his

estimates, particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff
has never made any attempt to provide estimates or expert
testimony to the contrary.
As a result of the evidence and testimony at the
time of trial, and the stipulation of the parties as contained
in the Pre-Trial Order, Plaintiff was awarded stocks, bonds,
and other liquid, marketable securities valued at the time of
trial at $1l2,091.00 (Tr.220; R.594, Tr. 221; R.595, Tr •. 243; R.617)
and awarded antique furnishings valued at $5 7, 125. 00.

(Exhibit 21-D).

Additionally, Plaintiff was awarded household

furnishings, jewelry, furs, Saab automobile and one-half of
the equity in the home for an additional award of $98, 030. 00.
(Exhibit 31-D), for a total award of $267 ,246.00.
Defendant on the other hand received his E-Systems
stock, his non-liquid retirement benefits, one-half of the
equity in the home and some miscellaneous items of personal
property, for a total value of $135, 540. 00.

(Exhibit 31-D).

Of the total property owned by the parties at the time of trial,
Plaintiff was awarded property valued at $267,246.00, or 66% of
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the total, and Defendant was awarded property valued at
$135,540.00 or 34% of the total.

If the stocks, securities

and antiques awarded to Plaintiff valued at $169,216.00 are
deleted from Plaintiff's award, she still received property
valued at $98,030.00, or 42% of the total property.
Plaintiff attempts to discredit the trial court's
decision by alleging

the trial judge misunderstood the value

of the retirement benefits of Defendant as set forth in
Exhibit 31-D.

The fact of the matter is, however, the trial

court had in its possession, and it is part of this trial
record, a published copy of Defendant's retirement benefits,
Therefore, the trial judge was well aware of the fact that
the values to be attached to Defendant's retirement benefits
must be present values, not estimated values some twenty years
into the future.

It was for this reason and on that basis

that the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, recognizing that these
retirement benefits were not to be available to Defendant
until retirement, reduced the inflated future values to present
values.
The trial court, in addressing the question as to the
division of personal property indicated that it may either
require an appraisal or in the alternative divide the property
based on documentary evidence and testimony.

(Tr.261 R.635).

In the final analysis, the trial court in fact did not request
an item-by-item appraisal of the personal property located in
the home, presumably because of the expense involved, (Tr· 259;
R. 633) and in fact made its distribution based upon the evidence
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and testimony provided at the time of trial.

(Tr.261; R.635).

It is certainly a well recognized fact that the trial
court does not have unlimited discretion in allocating personal
property and financial resources in matters of this nature.
However, it is also a well recognized fact that the trial
court does have considerable latitude in allocating personal
property and financial resources, and the decision of the trial
court in that regard will not be changed, unless its decision
works such inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
Wilson v Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) or unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the
trial court.

Adams v Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979).

In her brief, Plaintiff, in citing the case of
Read v Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) suggests that there were
some questions regarding the accuracy of estimates of value of
personal property, and on that basis the case ought to be
remanded to the trial court.

The fact of the matter is, however,

there was no confusion on the part of the trial judge, with the
exception of the value of Defendant's retirement benefits.
(Tr.256, 257; R.630,631).

In that regard, a printed copy of

Defendant's retirement plan was provided to the court, consistent
with its order.
deliberation.

(Tr.267; R.641), and presumably used in his
All of the remaining property of the parties,

however, including the home, stocks, bonds, furs, jewelry,
furnishings and fixtures were appraised by experts, including a
real estate agent, stock broker, furrier, professional jeweler
and professional estate appraiser.

In addition, Defendant
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offered his best opinion as to th e va 1 ues o f the furniture
and furnishings located in the home.

There was no contra-

dictory evidence before the court.
Furthermore, Read v

Read should be distinguished

from this case in that in the J:Zead case there was no evidence
before the trial court with regard to certain i terns of personal
property, and the findings of the court were inconsistent with
the evidence presented at the time of trial.

In

addition,~

the Read case the court awarded the wife 90% of the personal
Property and awarded the husband lOi'. of the personal nroperty.
In remanding the case, this court recognized that the property
distribution was not equitable, and that the trial court should
obtain additional evidence regarding the value of certain items
of personal property.
Plaintiff suggests that the detailed itemized valua·
tion prepared by defendant and verified by qualified professional appraisers is of no value.

Plaintiff further suggests

that the valuation of the jewelry at $19,886.00 is without any
evidence of present market or actual value.

To even suggest sue'

a thing is not only to cast doubt on the expertise of the expert
witness who so testified, but furthermore to contradict counsel
for Plaintiff who recognized that Defendant's expert witness
was a "well qualified gemologist". (Tr. 32;T.406).

Furthermore,

the jeweler testified that the basis for his valuation at the
time the appraisal was done was replacement cost, and further·
more, he testified that the value of gem stones and precious
metal had been subject to tremendous increases in value since
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:he date of the aporaisal of August 2, 1978.
(Exhibit D-19) ·

(Tr.3l;T405),

The appraiser of the contents of the home,

:iased upon a visual inspection and based upon numerous photographs taken during his visit (Exhibit 17-D) testified and
submitted his written estimate to the effect that on a piece
by piece sale,

the antique furnishings in the home, awarded

to the Plaintiff, would bring near $100,000.00.

That was the

uncontroverted evidence before the court, and was not rebutted
by any evidence of the Plaintiff.

This court recognized the advantaged position of the
trial judge to review and weigh the evidence in De Vas v Noble,
13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962), when it held:

Due to his function as the determiner of
the facts and his advantaged position in
close proximity to the witnesses and the
trial, it is his privilege to be the exclusive judge of the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given the
evidence and the facts to be found therefrom.
369 E2d at 293.

Plaintiff, in her brief, suggests that if the total
value of real and personal property awarded to Plaintiff is
reduced by the values assigned to her trust, National Bancshares stock and antiques, that Plaintiff's award of real
and personal property by the trial court would be reduced
to 16% of the remaining estate.
The fact of the matter is, however, that if the
trust and National Bancshares stock valued at $112,091.00, and
the antiques valued at $57,125.00 are deducted from the value
of real and personal property awarded to Plaintiff, she was
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still awarded $98,030.00 in real and personal property and
Defendant was awarded $135,540.00 in real and personal prop en:
which represents a 42% - 58% split.

Even given the worst case,

the 42% - 58% split, this property settlement is well within
the discretion of the trial court, particularly given the
fact

that

in reality Plaintiff was awarded real and

personal property valued at $26 7, 246. 00.

Plaintiff

suggests

that the property distribution by the trial court imposes
a penalty upon the Plaintiff.

In that regard counsel cites

the case of Read v Read (Supra) .

In the Read case, the trial

court awarded Plaintiff 90% of the real and personal property
and Defendant was awarded 10%.

In finding the trial court's

distribution inequitable this court concluded:
When a marriage has failed, a court's duty
is to consider the various factors relating
to the situation and to arrange the best
possible allocation of the property and
economic resources of the parties so that
the parties . . . can pursue their lives
in as hapoy and useful manner as possible.
If it appears that the decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation that
it will more likely lead to further difficulties and distress than to serve the
desired objective, then a reappraisal of
the decree must be undertaken.
594 P2d 872.
Plaintiff cites the case of Pope v Pope, 589 P2d
753 (Utah 1978) as authority for a property distribution
awarding 65% of the real and personal property to the Plaintiff/ wife, and 35% to the Defendant/ husband.

This court

upheld the decision of the trial court on the basis that the
Defendant/ husband received income producing property.
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In that regard, it should be pointed out, that of
che total real and personal property awarded to the Plaintiff,
in the amount of $267,246.00, $112,091.00 represents stocks,
~ands and other income producing, readily marketable securi-

ties.

Of the total property awarded to the Defendant, in

the amount of $135,540.00, only his shares in E-Systems
valued at $5 7, 361. 00 are income producing and readily marketable.

The value attributed to his pension and retirement fund

is not available to him at this time.
The decree of divorce in this matter, based upon all
of the evidence, is well within the discretionary authority of

the trial court.

The court awarded Plaintiff 66% ($267 ,246.00)

of the total real and personal property of the parties,or 42%

($98, 030. 00) of the total property if Plaintiff's stocks,
bonds and antiques are excluded from the property distribution
calculation.

In the case of Cox v Cox, 532 P2d 994 (Utah 1975),

this court held that a property distribution of one-third to
the wife and two-thirds to the husband was not an abuse of
the court's discretion.

In Cox the parties had been married for

approximately 15 years and had four children.

During the

marriage, the Plaintiff/wife had worked and had helped
Defendant/husband complete dental school.

After graduation,

she assisted Defendant and was employed in his practice as
a receptionist and bookkeeper.

At the time of trial, the

evidence indicated that the parties had accumulated personal
property valued at $210,000.00.

The trial court awarded one-

third of the personal property to the Plaintiff/wife and twoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thirds to the Defendant/husband.

I n up h o ld"ing t h e trial coun'

decision, this court held:
~ecause o~ the ~ariableness and complexities
i~volved in family troubles, there is no
firm rule or formula that can be uniformly
applied in all cases in the legal surgery
ne~essa:y to severing such relationships
which will best serve the desired objective
of allocating economic resources so that
the parties involved can reconstruct their
lives in the most happy and useful manner.
However, as an aid in that endeavor in
the past courts have often resorted.to a
general "rule of thumb", of one-third to
the wife and two-thirds to the husband .
Upon our survey of the circumstances of
these parties we see no reason to believe
that the application of that general rule
is so inequitable or unjust that we should
interfere therewith.

532 P.2d at 996.
Plaintiff in her brief alleges that the decree
leaves little but grossly overvalued personal property to t~
unemployable, uneducated wife and mother of twenty-nine years.
A review of the evidence presented at the time of
trial simply does not substantiate such a conclusion.
Although it is true that Plaintiff has not been employed
outside the home since her marriage to Defendant, she does
have a high school diploma and did attend the University of
Texas for one and one-half years.

(Tr.93; R.467).

With respect

to Plaintiff's allegation that the real and personal property
is grossly overvalued, the evidence and testimony proffered
at the time of trial and previously referred to herein
certainly proves that statement to be without merit.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the values
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attached to Defendant's ESOP Retirement Plan, valued at $19, 388. 00
and his ESY Pension Plan, valued at $20,247.00 created a question in the mind of the trial judge.

Although it is true there

was some confusion about Defendant's accessibility to his
retirement plan and his pension plan, those matters were resolved
in the mind of the trial judge when Defendant, pursuant to the
court's order, provided both counsel for the Plaintiff and
the trial judge, within 48 hours after the trial, a copy of
£-Systems Employee Handbook, which explained in detail the
retirement benefits of Defendant.

(Tr.266,267; R.640,641).

The E-Systems Employee Handbook made available to
the court verifies that the $19,388.00 in the ESOP Retirement
Plan is available to Defendant only upon the following conditions;
(1) one year after his date of termination from E-Systems or

(2) at such time as he retires after age 60.

The value of

Defendant's pension plan was determined at the pre-trial
conference conducted by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

Judge

Rigtrup and counsel for both parties recognized and agreed
chat the future value of Defendant's pension plan must be
reduced to a present value basis.

Judge Rigtrup, over the

objection of counsel for Defendant used an interest rate of
8% per annum in order to reduce the future value of the pension

plan to a present value of $20,247.00. (Pre-Trial Order P.2).
Had Judge Rigtrup used a rate of interest more in line with
current interest rates, such as 15% per annum as requested
by counsel for Defendant, the present value of the pension
Plan would have been reduced to $7, 879. 00.

In her brief
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Plaintiff suggests that the low 8% interest rate greatly under.
values the retirement fund.
the opposite is true.

The fact of the matter is, howeve:

The greatly understated rate of interes:

in fact overvalues the present value of Defendant's pension
plan.
Hith respect to whether or not the ESY Pension Plan
and the ESOP Retirement Plan ought to be property subject to
distribution, it should be noted that Defendant made that
information available to counsel for the Plaintiff and includec
those values as part of his proposed property settlement
contained in Exhibit 31-D.

It would be naive to think that

the trial court did not consider these amounts in its determination of what would be a fair and equitable distribution of
the real and personal property of the parties.
C.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering

That Mrs. Warren Pay A Disproportionate Amount Of The

~1arital

Liabilities.
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that the trial court
adopted without modification the proposed division of marital
obligations submitted by Defendant on Exhibit 33-D.

The fact

of the matter is, however, that the trial court did not adopt,
without change, the proposed division as set forth in Exhibit
33-D, in that in addition to the $4,604.00

Defendant proposed

he should pay, he was ordered to pay the mortgage arrears
in the sum of $1, 003. 00, which amount was originally included
in the amount proposed to be paid by Plaintiff, and
additionally Defendant was ordered to pay income tax
penalties and interest for Calend ar year 1979, not reflected
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in Exhibit 33-D, but part of the trial court's memorandum
decision, in the sum of $1,960.00.

Therefore, of the total

debts and obligations in the sum of $18,198.00, Plaintiff was
ordered to pay $10,631.00 and Defendant was ordered to pay
$7,567.00.
In making its decision relative to the distribution
of the obligations, the court obviously considered the testimony of the parties.

During examination, Plaintiff unequivo-

cally admitted that the balances due to Felt Buchorn and ZCMI
represented her own personal accounts.

(Tr.87,88; R.461,462).

Additionally, Plaintiff admitted incurring for her own personal
benefit, the charges on National Bank of Conunerce Master Charge,
Valley Bank Visa and Master Charge, Castleton's, Makoff's,
and Arent's. (Tr. 103-106; R.477-480).

In fact, without excep-

tion, each of the obligations Plaintiff was ordered to pay
she either agreed to pay or agreed were charges incurred by her
personally for her benefit.

In addition, in his testimony,

Defendant testified that the charge accounts in question were
either in the name of the Plaintiff or used exclusively by
the Plaintiff (Tr. 183-184; R.557-558, Tr.187; R.561).
When viewed in terms of the percentage of the total
obligations each of the parties was ordered to pay, Plaintiff
was ordered to pay $10,631.00 of the total of $18,198.00 of
debts and obligations, or 58% of the total, not the 72%
alleged by plaintiff in her brief.

Additionally, Defendant

was ordered to nay $7,567.00 of the debts and obligations,
or 42% of the total.

Furthermore, Plaintiff testified during
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the trial that some of the obligations Defendant proposed be
paid by Plaintiff in Exhibit 33-D, specifically Valley Bank anc
Trust Visa and 'faster Charge, Felt Buchorn, and ZC~I had
cumulatively been reduced at the time of trial in the amount
of $1,553.00 (Tr.87; R.46l)(Tr.104;R.478).

Taking that testi~c:

into consideration, Plaintiff's share of the obligations is
reduced and her percentage of total obligations she is requirea
to pay drops to 55% and Defendant's share of obligations he
is required to pay increases to 45%.

Considering that

practically all of the obligations were incurred by the

Pla~-

tiff for her personal benefit, such a distribution is more
than reasonable, and well within the discretion of the trial
court.
Plaintiff, in her brief, suggests that the

Defend~t

has a greater ability, based on the respective incomes of the
parties, to pay a substantially greater portion of the obligations of the parties.

In fact, however, Plaintiff has a

separate gross income of $1,800.00 per month, excluding any
allowance for income she may earn from future employment,
whereas Defendant has a net income of $1,487.00 per month.
Plaintiff also alleges that the trial court erred
by requiring her to pay one-half of the income tax deficit
for calendar year 1979.

It should be pointed out, and the

trial court so recognized, that the $5,207.00 income tax
deficit was in large part due to income Plaintiff had received
by way of stock dividends and interest income from her trust
and National Bancshares stock, and that Defendant's income
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1

from his employer had in fact been subject to withholding
the entire year.

Therefore, the income realized by Plaintiff

juosted the parties joint return into a substantially higher
income tax bracket and as a consequence resulted in the
~laintiff' s income being taxed at a substantially higher tax

rate than would have been the case had this been the only
income the parties had earned during calendar year 1979.
Plaintiff further suggests that Defendant admitted
~ving

used credit cards for his benefit or for the benefit

of the children.

The fact of the matter is, and the record

clearly so indicates, that Defendant admitted to two specific
charges on the Valley Bank and Trust Company Visa and l1aster
Char8e account.

In the one instance the Defendant purchased

a jacuzzi/whirlpool which was subsequently awarded to the
Plaintiff and in the second instance the Defendant purchased
a round-trip plane ticket for the parties' minor child. (Tr.
186; it. 560).

In fact throughout his testimony the Defendant

specifically denied any knowledge of any of the credit card
purchases.

Furthermore, he denied having any personal know-

ledge as to the nature of the items purchased other than the
fact they were purchased by the Plaintiff for the benefit of
the Plaintiff.

(Tr.187; R.561).

The distribution of marital obligations by the trial
court is certainly well within the court's discretionary
powers.

As noted in Baker,(Supra), the trial court has con-

siderable latitude in adjusting the financial affairs of
parties in a divorce proceeding.

In Christensen v Christensen,
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444 P.2d 511 (Utah 1968), at page 512 this court held:
Even though it is the established rule
that divorce c~ses being in equity, it is
the duty of this court to review and weigh
the evidence, it is equally true that we
have invariably recognized the advantaged
position of the trial judge and given
deference to his findings and judgment
declaring that they should not be upset
unless evidence clearly preponderates
against them, or unless the decree works
such an injustice that equity and conscience demand that it be revised.
The judgment of the trial court with respect to the
distribution of the debts and obligations of the parties was
not an abuse of the court's discretion.

Plaintiff agreed to

pay those obligations incurred solely by her.

Plaintiff

reaped the benefits of the purchases, since all of the
personal property that was so acquired was awarded to the
Plaintiff.
D.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awardir.:

An Insufficient Amount Of Alimony For Too Limited A Period Of
Time.
The evidence shows that Plaintiff has independent
income in the sum of $1,400.00 per month, (Exhibit 22-D)
(Pre-Trial Order, page 4, paragraph R) , and receives alimony
in the sum of $400.00 per month, for a total income of
$1,800.00 per month.

Defendant receives a net income, after

payment of alimony, in the amount of $1,487.00. (Exhibit 29-D)
Plaintiff in her brief grossly understates her
income when she suggests her gross income to be $1,200.00 per
month.

Obviously Plaintiff is ignoring the evidence and

· 1.
exhibits presente d at tria

The fact of the matter is, that
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plaintiff receives $800.00 per month income from her trust;
5600. 00 per month income from stock dividends; and $400. 00
per month alimony from the Defendant.

It seems inconceivable

to think that one person cannot live comfortably on a monthly
income of $1,800.00.

It should be noted that there are no

children living at home; she has no obligations keeping her
at home; Plaintiff is capable of finding employment to
further increase her monthly income.

In addition Plaintiff

has been awarded personal property consisting of stocks, bonds,
antiques and other liquid and readily marketable items of
personal property.
In citing English v English in her brief, Plaintiff
seems to suggest that a gross income of $1,800.00 per month,
without the benefit of income realizable from outside employment, is simply not enough to "prevent the wife from becoming
a public charge". English v English

565 P2d at 411.

Based upon the independent income of the Plaintiff
and based upon the vast amounts of real and personal property
awarded her in the decree of divorce, it seems somewhat unlikely that the Plaintiff need ever become a public charge.
This court has consistently held that the trial
court has broad discretion in determining when and how much,
if any, alimony is to be paid by one party to another.

There

are numerous Utah Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
issue of sufficiency or insufficiency of alimony.

These cases

can all be reduced to the basic premise that an award of
alimony by the trial court will not be disturbed unless the
evidence clearly demonstrates a misapplication of the law or
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an abuse of discretion.
In Adams v Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), at page
149, this court held:
An award of alimony . . . . is within the
soun? discretion of the court, and will not
be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings
of the court or there has been a misapplication of the law, or the court has clearly
abused its discretion.
In discussing the equitable powers of the trial
court with respect to the distribution of property and the
award of alimony, this court held in Curry v Curry, 7 Utah
2d 198, 321 P.2d 939 (1958) as follows:
The precept is well recognized that the
trial court is vested with broad equitable
powers in divorce matters and that its
judgment will not be disturbed lightly,
nor at all unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against his findings, or
there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity
is wrought.
7 Utah 2d at 203
Clearly the evidence being reviewed by this court
does not in any way suggest that the decision of the trial
judge was in any way unjust or unequitable.

Furthermore, the

income available to the Plaintiff is more than sufficient to
provide her with a comfortable standard of living.
In her brief Plaintiff suggests that she will now
be required to live off a severely depleted legacy and on
an insufficient amount of alimony while the Defendant takes
from the marriage any property that will provide an income
in the future.

It is interesting to note that the only
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income producing property the Defendant was awarded are 1214
shares of E-Systems stock valued at $57, 361. 00.

Defendant

was awarded no other income producing property.

On the other

'land, Plaintiff was awarded stocks, bonds and other marketable
' securities with a fair market value at the time of trial of
)112, 091. 00.

In addition, Plaintiff was awarded antiques,

valued at $57,125.00, furs, jewelry, one-half equity in the
home, and miscellaneous items of personal property valued at
che time of trial at $98,030.00.
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that she is being
asked to accept a dep1eted legacy, when in fact the value of
her trust has increased from May 28, 1956, when the principal
sum to

be managed was S66, 386. 01 to a value at the time of

trial of $98,126.00.

In addition, during that twenty-three

and one-half year period, there were distributions to Plaintiff
in the sum of $146,599.10.
Based upon the evidence and testimony offered at the
time of trial, the award of alimony to the Plaintiff, when
viewed in conjunction with the vast amount of personal
property awarded her, and her ability to obtain outside employment, is more than generous and well within the sound discretionary judgment of the trial court.
E.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Failing

To Award Mrs. Warren Any Attorney's Fees.
In her brief, Plaintiff alleges that she was ordered
to pay a substantial majority of the debts; was left with a
decreasing income; and that Defendant's income is six times
as p;reat as hers.

Plaintiff goes on to say that previous
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decisions of this court have held that under such circumstance;
·
an award of attorney's fees is appropriate.
There can be little argument with Plaintiff's contention that the award of attorney's fees is within the
discretion of the trial court.

Bader v Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407,

424 P.2d 150 (1967)' Adams v Adans, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 19 79)'
Alldredge v Alldredge, 229 P.2d681 (Utah 1951).
'·.!hat Plaintiff, however, has chosen to ignore is
the fact that at the time of trial there was no evidence
proffered to the court with respect to her need for an award
of attorney's fees, Defendant's ability to pay, or the amount
of attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff.

In fact,

counsel for Plaintiff, at a hearing subsequent to the trial,
readily admitted that no evidence had been proffered to the
court.

(Tr.8, 9, 10; R.651, 652, 653).
In that regard, this court has consistently held

that unless there is competent evidence proffered at the time
of trial to support an award of attorney's fees, none shall
be awarded.

In the case of Butler v Butler, 23 Utah 2d 259,

461 P.2d 727 (1969) this court reversed the trial court's
award of attorney's fees on the basis that there was no
evidence in the record to sustain such an award.

Such is the

case here.
Furthermore, the evidence in this case clearly demon·
strates that the Plaintiff is financially capable of paying
her own attorney's fees.

She not only has a gross income,

including alimony, of $1,800.00 per month, but she was also
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awarded a very substantial amount of real and personal property.
Plaintiff alleges that if she is required to pay her o-wn
attorney' s fees, this will result in an additional burden, and
reduce her monthly income.

In that regard it must be remem-

b2red that the burden of paying attorney's fees rests equally
heavy on Defendant's limited income.

It would seem that the

trial court's decision requiring the parties to pay their
own costs and attorney's fees was equitable, and ought to be
affirmed.
F.

Costs On Appeal.

Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, it
becomes readily apparent that Plaintiff's appeal of the decree
of divorce is without merit, and, as has been the situation

throughout these divorce proceedings, is a continuing
attempt on her part to create both mental and financial
hardship on the Defendant.

Therefore, and in the event this

court affirms the findings of the lower court, Defendant
respectfully requests this court to award him his costs and
attorney's fees on appeal.
Conclusion
Based on the testimony of witnesses and the evidence
presented at the time of trial, and based upon the thorough
consideration of the trial judge in arriving at a well
reasoned decision, there can be little doubt that the trial
judge was well within his discretionary powers in his award
of real and personal property, debts and obligations, alimony,

and attorney's fees.

Furthermore, Plaintiff in her brief
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has failed to demonstrate that the evidence presented at the
trial was contrary to the trial court's decision.
Based on the evidence the trial judge awarded the
Plaintiff $267,246.00 in real and personal property, or 66%
of the total, and awarded Defendant $135,540.00, or 34%;
ordered Plaintiff to pay $9, 078. 00 of the debts and obligations
of the parties, or 55% of the total, and ordered Defendant to
pay 45~~; awarded Plaintiff $400. 00 per month alimony, which,
when added to her independent income of $1, 400. 00 per month,
provides Plaintiff with a gross monthly income of $1,800.00;
and, based on the fact that there was no evidence to the
contrary, ordered each party to pay their respective costs and
attorney's fees.
In her brief, Plaintiff attempts to convince this
court that she has been dealt a severe financial blow by the
trial court, and that it simply will not be possible for her
to make ends meet.
to that conclusion.

The facts of the case simply do not lead
With the substantial award of real and

personal property, her monthly income of $1,800.00, and her
ability to find outside employment to further increase her
income, Plaintiff is financially secure, and ought to be able
to live very comfortably on her income.
The evidence presented at trial and subject to
review by this court clearly demonstrates that the trial
court's determination was equitable and clearly within the
discretionary power of the tryer of facts.

Therefore, the

decision of the trial court and the decree of divorce should
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be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this
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